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There’s a lot to like about this book. We’ll have something to say about what we 
like about it and what we do not like about it soon enough. For now, let’s take a 
look at the cover and at how handsomely the volume is presented by its publisher. 
The ochre tones and sensuous forms of the fruit and fingers on the cover come 
courtesy of a painting by Alexi Worth, and the indigo used for the title, the end 
flaps and the Harvard University Press seal complement the art beautifully. This is 
not incidental for a text that claims to have been informed by art and for a philo-
sophical practice that aspires to the practices of art. 
Appropriately, there is more to this cover than at first appears, because for Alva 
Noë things do not appear. They show up for us. The “varieties of presence” named 
in the title refer to the different and diverse ways things show up for us based on 
the skills we have at our disposal for perceiving or, rather, Noë would say, achiev-
ing what we might otherwise suppose appears. We can make an example of the 
cover art to illustrate this point. 
As it turns out, the image on the cover follows a motif used in other paintings by 
Worth where, by cropping and foreshortening, an object is represented as held up 
for our inspection. Framing this object by fingers, the image nicely imbricates see-
ing and touching, a theme that is important for Noë’s account. Ideally, the fruit in 
the cover image for a book by Alva Noë would show up for us as tomatoes. Here, 
they show up as apples, and they show up as such from what we have read in re-
views of Worth’s work and from what is left of the blossom that became one of 
these fruit and shows up as a star on the book’s spine. Seeing the fruit as apples, AVANT Volume III, Number 1/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
 
163
the fingers can take on a sexual connotation (as they have in a review of Worth’s 
painting by Ken Johnson, “Art in Review: Alexi Worth,” New York Times, 2 January 
2009). What we notice in the cover image is that the fingers are represented as 
using two apples to prop up a third.  
A very similar design shows up in Worth’s Pyramid (2008). In fact, the image on the 
cover of Noë’s book is taken from a painting, cropped and reduced, oil on canvas, 
titled Pyramid (Yellow) also from 2008. And while in the one painting we have five 
apples and a sight through the pyramid they form of a man wearing a grocer’s 
white apron using his hands to arrange the apples, in our image we have the fin-
gers from two right hands with no sign of the man or woman whose hands are 
making this arrangement. The fingers show up as belonging to two right hands by 
our making out the proximity of the knuckle and nail of what we would call a 
thumb in the image on the front of the cover and the curve of the fingers in the 
image on the back. This puzzle is clearer in the uncropped original of Pyramid (Yel-
low).  
Now, Noë likes puzzles and likes to think he’s solved several puzzles about percep-
tion and thought in his book. Worth likes to paint puzzles that don’t admit of easy 
solutions. Like many of Worth’s images, the puzzle in Pyramid (Yellow) stages a 
dialog with photography. With the flatness of the image and the sharp contrasting 
areas of light and dark Worth arguably pictures the effect of a photographic flash 
on  its  subject.  With  the  isolated  detail  presented  as  cropped  we  may  say  he 
presents the image as the result of a photographic enlargement. In remarks about 
his work Worth has commented about the ubiquity of photography in our world. 
As we have no doubt noticed ourselves, virtually everyone who carries a phone 
carries a camera. And while the history of art teaches that photography eclipsed 
the purpose of painting by giving us the faithful double of the world painting as-
pired to achieve, the ubiquity of photography ironically returns painting to that 
aim; photographs have become a part of the world that art aims to double, and it is 
not entirely clear that photography has any privileged access to a world that in-
cludes photographs. This leaves an artist like Worth to paint the world as it shows 
up, in a photograph, to someone with a specific skill set. Worth paints what a pain-
ter sees in a photograph – the specific ways a photograph represents and, a fortiori, 
distorts its subject – and in this way makes the world show up for us in ways it 
would not otherwise.  
 
Our aim is not to judge Noë’s book by its cover but to point out that the cover im-
age will show up or become present to a variety of readers in a variety of ways 
based on their capacity to see it or make it present in one way or another. This, at 
least potentially, makes the art especially appropriate for the book it covers. In his 
introduction, subtitled “Free Presence,” Noë uses the example of a work of art that 
may have left you flat coming alive or coming present to you because of something 
you overhear from another patron in the gallery. Noë’s point is that the work of art Immune System, Immune Self 
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in this example does not become present to you for free or without effort but only 
with the application of your recently heightened understanding of it. You have to 
work to achieve the art in this painting as we have worked to achieve a meaning 
for the art on the cover of Noë’s book. 
So, now, what about the meaning on the pages printed between these covers? Well, 
it comes down to this. “The world shows up for us,” Noë writes, “thanks to our 
mastery and exercise of skills of access. We achieve the world,” he continues, “by 
enacting  ourselves.  Insofar  as  we  achieve  access  to  the  world,  we  also  achieve 
access to ourselves” (12-13). What does this mean? It means that the world that 
shows up is present to us. And the presence of that world is an achievement of a 
“form  of  practical  knowledge  that  is  independent  of  language-use  and  that  is 
shared by humans and nonhumans alike” (24). It means that the world that shows 
up for us is the world we understand. And without this distinctly sensorimotor 
understanding, “there is no access” to the world “and so no perception” (20). Fur-
ther, since thought is largely, and exclusively when it is directed to an object, ex-
tended perception (28), thought, as perception, is an achievement of this under-
standing.  Exercising  and  mastering  skills  of  access,  we  enact  ourselves.  And  in 
enacting ourselves, we achieve a world. It is, however, only for the sake of achiev-
ing a world that we enact ourselves. In giving a general theory of access, Noë gives 
an account of how we become what we are in a world that shows up for us and 
those like us. 
For those wedded to a representational or causal model of thought and perception, 
this account will not be persuasive, and nothing Noë says or I can add by way of 
summary and exposition will likely change their minds. Apart from their deep-
seated convictions and commitments to shared evidence and the findings of neu-
roscience, they will want to know something about this understanding which is a 
precondition for thought and perception. They will want to know more about the 
sensorimotor  character  of  this  understanding,  about  what  it  means  to  say  the 
world shows up “not to our eyes, or brain, but to us” (32). The brain, they might 
well suppose, has a fundamental structure shared by all sentient beings, and this is 
the basis for the world appearing the same to all those beings. If an objects shows 
up to us but not our brains, how does the language independent, practical know-
ledge we variously enact lead to a shared world? Won’t the world that shows up 
for me and my skills of access be different from the world that shows up for you? 
 
Those trained in a continental philosophical tradition, on the other hand, will ap-
preciate Noë for making a case for a view close to their hearts in an idiom that will 
not be dismissed as obscure by those once called analysts. Readers versed in the 
writings of Edmund Husserl and in the important revisions of Husserl’s phenome-
nology  by  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty  will  be  quite  comfortable  with  the  idea  that 
things show up for us and not our brain. They will also readily accept that changes 
in my physical relation to an object changes the way that object shows up for me. AVANT Volume III, Number 1/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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They may be confused, though, when a discussion of thought as a kind of extended 
perception is presented as a new idea or when the idea of styles of thought and 
perception is presented without a citation to Merleau-Ponty who introduced the 
idea so many years ago.
1  
In a short section of text (52-55), Noë addresses what he calls “Merleau-Pontyan 
contextualism,” a concept he wrangles from Sean Kelly’s interpretation of Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy.
2 Noë’s discussion, in a chapter titled “Real Presence,” occurs in 
the context of an attempt to rectify the claims of perceptual constancy and percep-
tual nonconstancy. “A satisfying account of perception,” Noë tells us, “must explain 
how the silver dollar can look both circular and elliptical, how the tomatoes can 
look to be the same in size and yet different in size” (47). Noë rejects what he takes 
to be Kelly’s suggestion that context plays a normative role in seeing the coin as 
constantly circular in the face of its nonconstant varieties of elliptical presentation, 
because, he says, perception does not vary with the purposes it is put to; perception 
does not, that is, see the coin relative to some optimal presentation of it. Noë also 
balks at the idea that we can be aware of the context in the course of perception 
and, so, judge one way of seeing the coin as not optimal because in a different con-
text we would see more of it than we do now. 
Kelly’s point, however, following Merleau-Ponty, is that context is a positively inde-
terminate presence in perception. It is not what has not yet been determined, a 
view of the back of the tomato we do not see but might, which is a part of the con-
text for seeing the tomato from one side only as a three dimensional object. For 
Merleau-Ponty, as Kelly tells us, a sight of the back of the tomato is a positively in-
determinate presence in our perception of the tomato from one side only as a fully 
fleshed out piece of fruit. This would appear to be a variety of presence Noë would 
want to embrace, and he comes close in declaring that the Merleau-Pontyan con-
textualism he is considering “seems to collapse into something like the view” he is 
advocating (54). Yet, Noë falls back to a position we might more readily identify 
with Husserl when he declares that we encounter the roundness of the coin in en-
countering its elliptical presentation because of a “practical appreciation” that the 
apparent shape “depends on my spatial relation to the coin and would, therefore, 
be modified by movements” (54). Noë may be right to say that the perceptions of 
the coin as elliptical (the way an artist wanting to represent the coin would see it) 
and as circular are not incommensurate even if we cannot see the coin as elliptical 
and circular at the same time. It may not be right, however, that one cannot attend 
to the color and shape of an object at the same time; this would seem to be some-
thing artists do as a matter of course. 
                                                           
1    See  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty  “Indirect  Language  and  the  Voices  of  Silence,”  in  Signs,  trans.  Richard  C. 
McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 39-84; “Eye and Mind,” in The Primacy of Percep-
tion, trans. Colin Smith (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), xx-yy; and The Prose of the World, 
trans. John O’Neill (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969). 
2  Sean D. Kelly “Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty,” in Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty, ed. T. Carmon 
and M. Hansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 74-110. Immune System, Immune Self 
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Getting back to style, Merleau-Ponty introduced the idea in a discussion of what is 
positively indeterminate in language and art. Literature, Merleau-Ponty thought, 
pushes the determinate conventions of language to be expressive and arouse atten-
tion by tending toward what is indeterminate. “The writer’s task,” according to 
Merleau-Ponty, “is to choose, assemble, wield, and torment” linguistic conventions 
“in such a way as to induce the same sentiment of life that dwells in the writer at 
every moment” (Merleau-Ponty 1969: 48). This sentiment of life is the writer’s style 
which is not, as Malraux may have thought, a means for recreating or the conse-
quence of a way of perceiving the world but a translation of the writer’s otherwise 
indeterminate relation to the world (Merleau-Ponty 1969: 56). Style, in painting, 
Merleau-Ponty writes, emerges “at the point of contact between the painter and the 
world, in the hollow of the painter’s perception, and as an exigency which arises 
from that perception” (Merleau-Ponty 1969: 59). Generalized to the everyday expe-
rience of those who have not made a career from art, we might describe what Mer-
leau-Ponty calls style as a comportment, or as Noë might put it, a sensorimotor 
disposition that signs the way we experience the world. 
In  fact,  there  is  a  lot  in  Merleau-Ponty’s  account  that  squares  appreciably  with 
what Noë says he is after in this book. “This is a book,” Noë writes, “about pres-
ence, and its fragility. This is a book,” he continues, “about style 
about the foundational importance of the idea that we achieve the world for 
ourselves through different styles of active involvement.... Style is the face of 
a practice – it is its perceptible, recognizable quality (153). 
With one important exception, this is perfectly consistent with what Merleau-Ponty 
is trying to say. To the end of his life, Merleau-Ponty struggled with the rubric of 
interior and exterior positing, finally, an entwining of consciousness and the world 
he called “flesh.” Noë, to his credit, is pushing to a place that is no longer burdened 
with this struggle (154). In the actionist or enactive direct realism Noë is advocat-
ing, “perceiving is a direct relation to the world,” “an achievement of the sensory 
motor understanding” (65). There is no interiority of concepts that makes expe-
rience of the external, physical world possible. Perceptual experience and thought 
are achieved by the exercise and mastery of skills, the deployment of a sensorimo-
tor understanding Noë says we possess (69) but that he has also called the face of 
our practiced engagement with the world (153). 
For, if all that is the case is the world we achieve by enacting ourselves, and we 
enact  ourselves  to  achieve  this  world,  then  the  self  we  enact  is  the  self  that 
achieves this world. On Noë’s view, it would seem that perceiver and the world 
perceived come about together in the same sensorimotor achievement. There is no 
worry about entwining an inner experience of indeterminate meaning with the 
determinate world outside us. We achieve the world by enacting ourselves and 
achieve ourselves in achieving this world. This is not the result of an understand-
ing we possess so much as it is the face of our sensorimotor capacities, our style. AVANT Volume III, Number 1/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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What Noë calls sensorimotor understanding is the practical disposition of the af-
fordances and skills that bring us into contact with the world. It is in this sense that 
perception can be “a nonintentional relation to the world” and an enactment of the 
understanding that enables us to achieve this relation (73). 
One difficulty with this view as Noë presents it is that the affordances that might 
enable us to achieve a world are not equally accessible. Noë follows James J. Gib-
son in calling affordances “the possibilities for action provided by things” (120). His 
focus,  as  Gibson’s,  is  on  opposing  this  view  to  the  “perception-as-classification” 
model of traditional cognitive science. He seems to allow that the world affords 
different things to different people, because they have different skill sets, but he 
does seem to notice that there may be artificial barriers to the acquisition of cer-
tain skills and limits to the access some individuals will have to the world. Affor-
dances are not just picked up “the way we might pick up pebbles on the beach” 
(29n8). They show up for us as a result of the skills we exercise, the worlds we 
achieve and the selves we enact. And these exercises, these worlds, these selves 
will vary in ways we are not always free to decide. 
Still, what Noë says in his “Afterword” holds out the promise for changes in the 
availability of affordances and the access these affordances enable us to achieve. 
For while our access to the world is achieved by what we know and can do, and 
limited in the same way, this access, Noë says, is liable to disruption, worries and 
doubts. More promisingly, Noë writes, “The question of style – the need for differ-
ent, maybe better ways of carrying on – is always with us” (154, italics in the origi-
nal). Our “captivity,” he says, by pictures and advertising, architecture and ideolo-
gy, is never total and “this tension between the ways our understanding opens up 
and the ways it closes off the world for us is a conversation we can’t help but keep 
having” (154). This conversation is the work of philosophy and art, and it is this 
conversation that enables us to remake ourselves, our skills and our understand-
ing.  
These conclusions are all well and good, but Noë ends his book by an appeal to 
grace. “We can’t invent new languages or new pictorialities, new ways of think-
ing,” he writes. “But we also can’t stop them from inventing themselves” (155, ital-
ics in the original). This is puzzling. Perhaps Alexi Worth is only discovering new 
pictorialities and not inventing them, but if the question of style is always with us, 
we will not wait for grace to discover the worries and doubts that can disrupt our 
settled understanding of things. If the question of style is always with us, we will 
seek out these disruptions and actively enter into conversations that enable us to 
think differently and open access to the world for ourselves and others.
3  
 
                                                           
3  Special thanks to Alexi Worth and Heidi Lange of DC Moore Gallery for their assistance in writing about the 
cover art for this book. 